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7.1  Introduction 
To  examine the question of optimal investment strategies for university en- 
dowment funds, one must of course address the issue of the objective function 
by  which  optimality is  to  be  measured.  My  impression is that practicing 
money managers essentially sidestep the issue by focusing on generically ef- 
ficient risk-return objective functions for investment which are just as appli- 
cable to individuals or nonacademic institutions as they are to universities. 
Perhaps the most common objective of this type is mean-variance efficiency 
for the portfolio’s allocations. Black (1976) provides a deeper approach along 
those lines that takes account of tax and other institutional factors, including 
certain types of nonendowment assets held by institutions. The Ford Founda- 
tion study of  1969 gave some early practical (if ex post, somewhat untimely) 
guidance for investment allocations. 
Much of the academic literature (which is not copious) seems to focus on 
appropriate spending policy for endowment, taking as given that the objective 
for endowment is to provide a perpetual level flow of  expected real income 
(cf. Eisner  1974; Litvack, Malkiel, and Quandt 1974; Nichols 1974; Tobin 
1974). Ennis and Williamson (1976) present a history of spending patterns by 
universities and a discussion of  various spending rules adopted. They also 
discuss the interaction between spending and investment policies. Fama and 
Jensen (1985) discuss the role of  nonprofit institutions as part of  a general 
analysis of organizational forms and investment objective functions, but they 
do not address the functions of endowment in such institutions. 
In contrast, Hansmann (1990) provides a focused and comprehensive re- 
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view of the various possible roles for a university’s endowment. Despite the 
broad coverage of possibilities ranging from tax incentives to promoting inter- 
generational equity, he is unable to find compelling empirical evidence to sup- 
port any particular combination of objectives. Indeed, he concludes that “pre- 
vailing  endowment  spending rules  seem  inconsistent  with  most  of  these 
objectives” (p. 39). Hansmann goes on to assert (pp. 39-40): 
It appears, however, that surprisingly little thought has been devoted to the 
purposes for which endowments are maintained and that, as a consequence, 
their rate of  accumulation  and the pattern of  spending from their income 
have been managed without much attention to the ultimate objectives of the 
institutions that hold them. 
The course taken here to address this question is in the middle range: it does 
not attempt to specify in detail the objective function for the university, but it 
does derive optimal investment  and expenditure  policy  for endowment in a 
context which takes account of overall university objectives and the availabil- 
ity of other sources of revenue besides endowment. In that respect, it follows 
along lines similar to the discussion in Black (1976, 26-28).  In addition, our 
model takes explicit account of the uncertainties surrounding the costs of uni- 
versity activities. As a result, the analysis reveals another (perhaps somewhat 
latent)  purpose  for  endowment:  namely,  hedging  against  unanticipated 
changes in those costs. Formal trading rules for implementing this hedging 
function are derived in sections 7.3 and 7.4. However, the paper neither as- 
sesses which costs, as an empirical matter, are more important to hedge nor 
examines the feasibility of  hedging those costs using available traded securi- 
ties.  The interested  reader should  see  Brinkman  (1981,  1990), Brovender 
(1974), Nordhaus (1989), and Snyder (1988), where the various costs of  uni- 
versities are described and modeled, both historically and prospectively. 
Grinold,  Hopkins,  and Massy (1978) develop a  budget-planning  model 
which  also integrates  endowment returns  with  other revenue  and  expense 
flows of the university. However, their model differs significantly from the one 
presented here, perhaps because their focus is on developing policy guidelines 
for expenditures instead of optimal intertemporal management of endowment. 
In  the  section  to follow,  we describe the basic  insights provided  by  our 
analysis and discuss in a qualitative fashion the prescriptions for endowment 
policy. The formal mathematical  model for optimal expenditures and invest- 
ment that supports those prescriptions is developed in sections 7.3 and 7.4. It 
is  based  on  a  standard  intertemporal  consumption  and  portfolio-selection 
model. Hence, the formal structure of the optimal demand functions is already 
widely studied in the literature. It is the application of this model to the man- 
agement of university endowment which is new. For analytical simplicity and 
clarity, the model  is formulated in continuous  time. However,  it is evident 
from the work of Constantinides (1989), Long (1974), and Merton (1977) that 
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7.2  Overview of Basic Insights and Prescriptions for Policy 
As indicated at the outset, a standard approach to the management of  en- 
dowment is to treat it as if it were the only asset of the university. A conse- 
quence of this approach is that optimal portfolio strategies are focused exclu- 
sively on providing  an efficient trade-off between  risk and expected return. 
The most commonly used measure of endowment portfolio risk is the variance 
(or equivalently,  standard  deviation)  of  the  portfolio’s  return.  As  is  well 
known, the returns on all mean-variance efficient portfolios are perfectly cor- 
related. Thus, a further consequence of treating endowment as the only asset 
is that the optimal endowment portfolios of different universities should have 
quite similar risky investment allocations,  at least as measured by the corre- 
lations of the portfolio returns. 
Universities, as we all know, do have other assets, both tangible and intan- 
gible, many of which are important sources of cash flow. Examples of such 
sources  are  gifts,  bequests,  university  business  income,  and  public-  and 
private-sector grants. Taking explicit account of those assets in the determi- 
nation of the endowment portfolio can cause the optimal composition of that 
portfolio to deviate significantly from mean-variance efficiency. That is, two 
universities  with  similar objectives  and endowments of the  same size can 
nevertheless have very different optimal endowment portfolios if their nonen- 
dowment sources of cash flow are different. 
A procedure for selecting the investments for the endowment portfolio that 
takes account of nonendowment assets includes the following steps: 
1. Estimate the market value that each of the cash flow sources would have 
if  it were a traded asset. Also determine the investment risk characteristics 
that each of those assets would have as a traded asset. 
2. Compute the total wealrh or net worth of the university  by adding the 
capitalized values of all the cash flow sources to the value of the endowment. 
3. Determine the optimal portfolio allocation among traded assets, using 
the university’s total wealth as a base. That is, treat both endowment and cash 
flow-source  assets as if they could be traded. 
4. Using  the risk characteristics  determined in step 1, estimate  the “im- 
plicit” investment in each traded-asset category that the university  has as the 
result of owning the nonendowment  (cash flow-source)  assets. Subtract those 
implicit investment amounts from the optimal portfolio allocations computed 
in step 3, to determine the optimal “explicit” investment in each traded asset, 
which  is the actual  optimal investment  allocation  for the endowment  port- 
folio. 
As a simple illustration, consider a university with $400 million in endow- 
ment assets and a single nonendowment  cash flow source. Suppose that the 
only traded  assets are stocks and cash. Suppose further that the university 
estimates in step 1 that the capitalized value of the cash flow source is $200 
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and $100 million in cash. Thus, the total wealth of the university in step 2 is 
(400 + 200 =  ) $600 million. Suppose that from standard portfolio-selection 
techniques, the optimal fractional allocation in step 3 is .6 in stocks and .4 in 
cash, or $360 million and $240 million, respectively. From the hypothesized 
risk characteristics in step 1, the university  already has an (implicit) invest- 
ment  of  $100 million  in  stocks from its  nonendowment  cash flow  source. 
Therefore, we have in step 4 that the optimal amount for the endowment port- 
folio to invest in stocks is $260 million, the difference between the $360 mil- 
lion  optimal  total  investment  in  stocks and the  $100 million  implicit  part. 
Similarly, the optimal amount of endowment invested in cash equals (240 - 
100 =)  $140 million. 
The effect on the composition of the optimal endowment portfolio induced 
by differences  in the size of  nonendowment assets can be decomposed into 
two parts: the wealth effect and the substitution effect. To illustrate the wealth 
effect,  consider two universities  with  identical preference functions and the 
same size endowments, but one has nonendowment assets and the other does 
not. If, as is perhaps reasonable to suppose, the preference function common 
to each exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the university with the 
nonendowment assets (and hence larger net worth) will prefer to have a larger 
total investment in risky assets. So  a university with a $400 million endow- 
ment as its only asset would be expected to choose a dollar exposure to stocks 
that is smaller than the $360 million chosen in our simple example by a uni- 
versity with the same size endowment and a nonendowment asset valued at 
$200 million. Such behavior is consistent with the belief that wealthier uni- 
versities can “afford’ to take larger risks with their investments. Thus, if  the 
average  risk  of  the  nonendowment  assets  is  the  same as the  risk  of  the 
endowment-only university’s portfolio,  then the university  with those assets 
will optimally invest more of its endowment in risky assets. 
The substitution effect on the endowment portfolio is caused by the substi- 
tution of nonendowment asset holdings for endowment asset holdings. To il- 
lustrate, consider again our simple example of a university with a $400 mil- 
lion endowment and a $200 million nonendowment asset. However, suppose 
that the risk characteristics of the asset are changed so that it is equivalent to 
holding  $200  million  in  stocks  and  no cash.  Now,  in  step 4, the  optimal 
amount for the endowment portfolio to invest in stocks is $160 million, the 
difference between the $360 million optimal total investment in stocks and the 
$200 million implicit part represented by the nonendowment asset. The opti- 
mal amount of endowment invested in cash rises to (240 -  0 =)  $240 mil- 
lion. If instead the risk characteristics of the asset had changed in the other 
direction to an equivalent holding of  $0 in stocks and $200 million in cash, 
the optimal composition of the endowment portfolio would be (360 - 0 =) 
$360 million in stocks and (240 -  200 =) $40 million in cash. 
Note that the changes in risk characteristics do not change the optimal de- 
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However, the nonendowment assets are not carried in the endowment portfo- 
lio. Hence, different risk characteristics for those assets do change the amount 
of  substitution they provide for stocks and cash in the endowment portfolio. 
Thus, the composition of the endowment portfolio will be affected in both the 
scale and fractional allocations among assets. 
With the basic concept of the substitution effect established, we now apply 
it in some examples to illustrate its implications for endowment investment 
policy. Consider a university that on a regular basis receives donations from 
alums. Clearly, the cash flows from future contributions are an asset of  the 
university, albeit an intangible one.  Suppose that the actual amount of  gift 
giving is known to be quite sensitive to the performance of the general stock 
market. That is, when the market does well,  gifts are high; when  it  does 
poorly, gifts are low. Through this gift-giving process, the university thus has 
a “shadow” investment in the stock market. Hence, all else the same, it should 
hold a smaller portion of its endowment in stocks than would another univer- 
sity with smaller amounts of such market-sensitive gift giving. 
The same principle applies to more specific asset classes. If  an important 
part of gifts to a school that specializes in science and engineering comes from 
entrepreneur alums, then the school de fact0 has a large investment in venture 
capital and high-tech companies, and it should therefore invest less of its en- 
dowment funds in those areas. Indeed, if  a donor is expected to give a large 
block of  a particular stock, then the optimal explicit holding of that stock in 
the endowment can be negative. Of  course, an actual short position may not 
be truly optimal if  such short sales offend the donor. That the school should 
optimally invest less of  its endowment in the science and technology areas 
where its faculty and students have special expertise may seem a bit paradox- 
ical. But the paradox is resolved by the principle of  diversification once the 
endowment is recognized as representing only a part of the assets of the uni- 
versity. 
The same analysis and conclusion apply if alum wealth concentrations are 
in a different class of  assets, such as real estate instead of  shares of  stock. 
Moreover, much the same story also applies if we were to change the example 
by substituting government and corporate grants for donations and gift giving 
as the sources of cash flows. That is, the magnitudes of such grant support for 
engineering and applied science may well be positively correlated with the 
financial performance of  companies in high-tech industries. If  so, then the 
prospect  of  future cash  flows  to  the  university  from  the  grants  creates a 
shadow investment in those companies. 
The focus of our analysis is on optimal asset allocation for the endowment 
portfolio. However, the nature and size of a university’s nonendowment assets 
significantly influence optimal policy for spending endowment. As shown in 
section 7.4,  for a given overall expenditure rate as a fraction of the university’s 
total net worth, the optimal spending rate out of  endowment will vary, de- 
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expected growth rate of cash flows generated by those assets, and capitaliza- 
tion rates. Hence, neglecting those other assets will generally bias the optimal 
expenditure policy for endowment. 
In addition to taking account of nonendowment assets, our analysis differs 
from the  norm because  it takes account of the uncertainty  surrounding the 
costs of  the  various  activities such as education,  research,  and knowledge 
storage that define the purpose of the university. The breakdown of activities 
can of course be considerably more refined. For instance, one activity could 
be the education of a full-tuition-paying  undergraduate,  and a second could 
be the education of an undergraduate who receives financial aid. The unit (net) 
cost of the former is the unit cost of providing the education less the tuition 
received, and the unit cost of the latter is this cost plus the financial aid given. 
As formally demonstrated in section 7.3, an important function of endowment 
investments is to hedge against unanticipated  changes in the costs of univer- 
sity activities. 
Consider, for example, the decision as to how much (if any) of the univer- 
sity’s endowment  to invest in local  residential  real  estate.  From a standard 
mean-variance  efficiency analysis,  it is unlikely  that any material portion of 
the endowment should be invested in this asset class. However, consider the 
cost structure  faced by  the university  for providing teaching  and research. 
Perhaps the single largest component is faculty  salaries.  Universities of the 
same type and quality compete for faculty from the same pools. To be com- 
petitive, they must offer a similar standard of living. Probably the largest part 
of the differences among universities in the cost of providing this same stan- 
dard of living is local housing costs. The university that invests in local resi- 
dential housing hedges itself against this future cost uncertainty by acquiring 
an asset  whose  value  is higher than expected  when  the differential  cost of 
faculty salaries is higher than expected.  This same asset may also provide a 
hedge against unanticipated higher costs of off-campus housing for students 
that would in turn require more financial aid if the university is to compete for 
the best students.  Note that this prescription of  targeted  investment  in very 
specific real estate assets to hedge against an unanticipated rise in a particular 
university’s costs of  faculty salaries and student aid should not be confused 
with the often-stated (but empirically questionable) assertion that investments 
in real estate generally are a good hedge against inflation. See Bodie (1976, 
1982) for empirical analysis of the optimal assets for hedging against general 
inflation. 
Similar arguments could be used to justify targeted investment of endow- 
ment  in  various  commodities  such  as  oil  as  hedges  against  unanticipated 
changes in energy costs. Uncertainty about those costs is especially significant 
for universities located in extreme climates and for universities  with  major 
laboratories and medical facilities that consume large quantities of energy. 
The hedging role for endowment can cause optimal investment  positions 
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effects of nonendowment assets. For example, consider a specialized institute 
of biology that receives grants from biotech companies and gifts from finan- 
cially successful alums. As already explained,  such an institute has a large 
shadow  investment  in biotech  stocks,  and  it  should  therefore underweight 
(perhaps to zero) its endowment investments in such stocks. Suppose, how- 
ever, that the institute believes  the  cost of  keeping top faculty will rise by 
considerably more than tuition or grants in the event that there  is a strong 
demand for such scientists outside academe. Then it may be optimal to invest 
a portion of its endowment in biotech stocks to hedge this cost, even though 
those stocks’ returns are highly correlated with alum gifts and industry grants. 
As  demonstrated  in section 7.3, the hedging role for endowment derived 
here is formally valid as long as there are traded securities with returns that 
have nonzero correlations  with unanticipated  changes in the activity  costs. 
However, the practical significance for this role turns on the magnitude of the 
correlations. As illustrated in Bodie’s (1976, 1982) work on hedging against 
inflation, it is often difficult to construct portfolios (using only standard types 
of  traded securities) that are highly correlated with changes in the prices of 
specific goods and services.  Nevertheless, the enormous strides in financial 
engineering over the last decade have greatly expanded the opportunities for 
custom financial contracting at reasonable costs. As we move into the twenty- 
first century, it will become increasingly more common for the financial ser- 
vices industry to offer its customers private contracts or securities that allow 
efficient hedging when the return properties of publicly traded securities are 
inadequate. That is, implementation of  the quantitative strategies prescribed 
in sections 7.3 and 7.4 will become increasingly more practical for universi- 
ties and other endowment institutions. See Merton (1990b, chap. 14; 1990c, 
264-69)  for a prospective view on financial innovation and the development 
of custom financial contracting. 
There are of  course a variety of  issues involving endowment management 
that have not been addressed but could be within the context of  our model. 
One such  issue  is  the  decision  whether  to invest  endowment  in  specific- 
purpose real  assets such as dormitories and laboratories instead of  financial 
(or general-purpose physical) assets. The returns on those real assets are likely 
to be strongly correlated with the costs of particular university activities, and 
thereby the assets form a good hedge against unexpected rises in those costs. 
However, because the real-asset investments are specialized and largely irre- 
versible, shifting the asset mix toward such investments reduces flexibility for 
the university. That is, with financial assets, the university has more options 
as to what it can do in the future. In future research,  I plan to analyze this 
choice problem more formally by using  contingent-claims analysis to value 
the trade-off between greater flexibility in selecting future activities and lower 
costs in producing a given set of activities. 
Another issue not explicitly examined is the impact long-term, fixed liabil- 
ities such as faculty tenure contracts have on the management of endowment. 218  Robert C. Merton 
Our formal model of sections 7.3 and 7.4 that uses contingent-claims analysis 
(CCA) can handle this extension. See McDonald (1974) and Merton (1985) 
for CCA-type models for valuing tenure and other wage guarantee contracts. 
In summary, the paper explores two classes of reasons why optimal endow- 
ment investment policy and expenditure policy can vary significantly among 
universities. The analysis suggests that trustees and others who judge the pru- 
dence and performance of policies by comparisons across institutions should 
take account of differences in both the mix of activities of the institutions and 
the capitalized values of their nonendowment sources of cash flows. 
The overview completed, we now  turn to the development of  the mathe- 
matical model for the process and the derivation of the quantitative rules for 
implementation. 
7.3  The Model 
The functions or purposes of the university are assumed to be a collection 
of  activities or outputs such as education, training, research, and storage of 
knowledge.  We further assume that the intensities of  those activities can be 
quantified and that a preference ordering exists for ranking alternative inter- 
temporal programs. In particular, the criterion function for this ranking can be 
written as 
m 
where Q,(t) denotes the quantity of activity j  per unit time undertaken at time 
t,  j  = 1, . . . ,m;  the preference function U is assumed to be strictly concave 
in  (Q,, . . . ,QJ  and E, denotes the  expectation  operator,  conditional on 
knowing all relevant information as of time t. This preference ordering satis- 
fies the classic von Neumann-Morgenstern  axioms of  choice, exhibits posi- 
tive risk aversion, and includes survival (of the institution) as a possible objec- 
tive. The infinite time horizon structure in (1) implies only that there need not 
be a definite date when  the university  will  liquidate.  As shown in  Merton 
(1990b,  149-51,  609-ll),  U can reflect the mortality  characteristics of an 
uncertain liquidation date. 
The intertemporally additive and independent preference  structure in  (1) 
can be generalized to include nonadditivity, habit formation, and other path- 
dependent effects on preferences, along the lines of  Bergman (1985), Con- 
stantinides (1990), Detemple and Zapatero (1989), Duffie and Epstein (1992), 
Hindy and Huang (1992),  Sundaresan (1989), and Svensson (1989). How- 
ever, as shown in Merton  (1990b,  207-9),  those more realistic preference 
functions  do not  materially  affect the optimal  portfolio  demand  functions. 
Moreover, just as Grossman and Laroque (1990) show for transactions costs 
in consumption, so it can be shown here that imposing adjustment costs for 
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portfolio demand functions. Hence, because the focus of the paper is on opti- 
mal investment (rather than on optimal expenditure) strategies, we assume no 
adjustment costs for activities and retain the additive independent preference 
specification to provide analytical simplicity, 
Let S,(t)  denote the  (net) cost to the  university  of providing one unit of 
activity j at time t,  j  = 1, . . . ,m.  For example, ifj = 1 denotes the activity 
of  having full-tuition-paying  undergraduates, then S,  would be the unit cost 
of  providing the education minus the tuition received. If j = 2 denotes the 
activity of  having undergraduates  who receive financial aid, the unit cost S, 
would equal S,  plus the financial aid given. In general, all costs and receipts 
such as tuition  that are directly linked to the quantities of  specific activities 
undertaken are put into the activity costs or prices, (S,). As will be described, 
fixed costs and sources of positive  cash flows to the university  that do not 
depend directly on the activity quantities are handled separately. As in Merton 
(1990b, 202, 499), we assume that the dynamics for these costs are described 
by the stochastic differential equations: for S  =  (S,,  . . . ,S,,,), 
(2)  dS, =  &(S,t)S,dr + g,(S,t)S,dq,  ,j  = 1, . . . ,m  , 
where8 is the instantaneous expected rate of  growth in S,, g,  is the instanta- 
neous standard deviation of the growth rate, and dq, is a Wiener process with 
the instantaneous correlation coefficient between dq, and dq, given by u,,, i, 
j = 1, . . . ,m.  f,  and g, are such that dS, 2  0 for S,  = 0, which ensures that 
S,(t) 2 0. Especially since (S) has components that depend on tuition, finan- 
cial aid, and other variables over which the university has some control, one 
would expect that the dynamic path for those costs would be at least partially 
endogenous  and  controllable  by  the  university,  even  though  competition 
among  universities  would  limit  the  degree  of  controllability.  However,  as 
specified, (2) is an exogenous process, not controlled by the university. Alter- 
natively, it can be viewed as the “reduced-form” process for S  after optimiza- 
tion over nonportfolio choice variables. 
The university is assumed to have N nonendowment sources of cash flows, 
which we denote by Y,(t)dt for the kth source at time r. As noted in section 
7.2, examples of such sources are gifts, bequests, university business income, 
and public- and private-sector grants. It can also be used to capture transfer 
pricing for the use of buildings and other university-specific assets where Y,  is 
the rental rate and this rental fee appears as an offsetting charge in the (S,) for 
the appropriate university  activities. The dynamics for these cash flows are 
modeled by, for Y =  (Y,, . . . ,YJ, 
(3) 
where pk  and 6, depend at most on the current levels of the cash flows and the 
unit costs of university activities and de, is a Wiener process, k = 1, . . . ,N. 
Equation (3) can also be used to take account of fixed costs or liabilities of the 
university such as faculty tenure commitments, by letting Yk < 0 to reflect a 220  Robert C. Merton 
cash outflow. However, the focus here is on assets only, and therefore we as- 
sume that p, and 6, are such that dY, ? 0 for Y, = 0, which implies that Yk(f) 
2  0 for all t. 
By inspection of (2) and (3), the dynamics for (Y,S)  are jointly Markov. A 
more realistic model would have pk  and 6, depend on both current and histor- 
ical values of Q ,  , . . . ,Qm.  For example, if a university has undertaken large 
amounts of research activities in the past, it may attract more grants and gifts 
in the future. The university  may also affect the future expected cash flows 
from nonendowment sources by investing now in building up those sources. 
Thus, the dynamic process for Y should be in part controllable by the univer- 
sity. However, again for analytical simplicity, the Y process is taken as exoge- 
nous, because that abstraction does not significantly alter the optimal portfolio 
demand functions. 
If for k  =  1, . . . ,N, Vk(t)  denotes the capitalized value at time t of the 
stream of future cash flows, Yk(7)  for T 2  t, and if K(t)  denotes the value of 
the endowment at time t,  then the net worth or wealth of the university, W(t) 
is given by 
(4) 
A model for determining the Vk(t)  from the posited cash flow dynamics in (3) 
is developed in section 7.4. 
The endowment of the university is assumed to be invested in traded assets. 
There are n  risky assets and a riskless asset. If P,(t) denotes the price of thejth 
risky asset at time t,  then the return dynamics for the risky assets are given by, 
forj = 1,.  . . ,n, 
(5)  dP, = aJP,dt + oJPJdZJ  , 
where a,  is the instantaneous expected return on assetj; uJ  is the instantaneous 
standard deviation of  the return; and dZ, is a Wiener process. The instanta- 
neous correlation coefficients (p,,,qk,,{,,)  are defined by, forj = 1, . . . ,n, 
n 
W(t) = K(t) + CVk(t)  . 
1 
dZ,dZ, = ~,~dt  ,  i = 1, . . . ,n 
dqkdZJ = qkJdt  ,  k  = 1, . . . ,m 
de&  = &dt  ,  1 = 1, . . . ,N. 
For computational simplicity and to better isolate the special characteristics of 
endowment management from general portfolio management, we simplify the 
return  dynamics  specification and  assume that  (aJ,uJ,p,)  are constants over 
time,  i, j  =  1, . . .  ,n.  As shown in Merton  (1990b, chaps.  4, 5, 6),  this 
assumption  of  a constant  investment  opportunity  set  implies  that  [P,(t  + 
~)/P,(t)l,  j = 1, . . . ,n,  for T  > 0 are jointly lognormally distributed. The 
riskless asset earns the interest rate r,  which is also constant over time. Opti- 
mal portfolio  selection for general return  dynamics would  follow along the 
lines of Merton (1990a, sec. 7; 1990b, chaps. 5, 15, 16). 
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To  analyze the optimal intertemporal expenditure and portfolio-selection 
problem for the university, we begin with a further simplified version of  the 
model in which the university's entire net worth is endowment (i.e., Yk[t]  = 
V,(t) = 0, k  = 1, . . . ,N and W(t) = K[t]).  The budget equation dynamics 
for W(t)  are then given by 
where wj(t) = the fraction of the university's wealth allocated to risky asset j 
at time t,  j = 1, . . . ,n;  the fraction allocated to the riskless asset is thus 1 - 
2  w,. Trustees, donors, and the government are assumed not to impose ex- 
plicit limitations on investment policy for the endowment, other than general 
considerations of prudence. In particular, borrowing and short selling are per- 
mitted, so the choice for (w,) is unrestricted. We  further posit that spending 
out of endowment is not restricted, either with respect to overall expenditure 
or  with respect to the specific activities on which it is spent. However, we do 
impose the feasibility restrictions that total expenditure at time t, E;,  QJ,, 
must be nonnegative and zero wealth is an  absorbing state (i.e., W[t]  = 0 
implies W[t  + T] = 0 for 7  > 0). 
At each time t,  the university chooses a quantity of activities (Q, ,  . . . ,Q,) 
and a portfolio allocation of its wealth so as to maximize lifetime utility of the 
university as specified in  (1).  Just as for the case of  multiple consumption 
goods analyzed in Breeden (  1979), Fischer (  1975), and Merton ( 1990b, 205), 
so the solution for the optimal program here can be decomposed into two 
parts. First, at each t,  solve for the utility-maximizing quantities of individual 
activities, (Q,, . . . ,ern),  subject to an overall expenditure constraint, C(t) = 
C;,  Q,(t)S,(t).  Second, solve for the optimal level of  overall expenditures at 
time t and the optimal portfolio allocation of endowment. 
The first part is essentially the static activity-choice problem with no uncer- 
tainty 
subject to C(t)  = Z;,  Q$k(t). The first-order conditions for the optimal activity 
bundle (Q;, . . . ,Q;)  are given by, forS,(t)  = s&, 
with C(r) = C;lQ;S,,  where subscripts on U denote partial derivatives (i.e., 0, 
= dU//aQ,). It follows from (8) that the optimal quantities can be written as 
Q;  = Q;[C(t),S(t),t], k = 1, . . . ,m  . 
Define the indirect utility function U by U[C(t),S(t),t]  = U(Qr, . . . ,em,t). 
By substituting U for U,  we can rewrite (1) as 222  Robert C. Merton 
m 
(9)  max Eo[l  U[C(r),S(t),rIdt}  , 
where the “max” in (9) is over the intertemporal expenditure path [C(t)]  and 
portfolio allocations [wj(t)].  Thus, the original optimization problem is trans- 
formed into a single-expenditure choice problem with “state-dependent’’ util- 
ity (where the “states” are the relative costs or prices of the various activities). 
Once the optimal total expenditure rules, [C*(t)],  are determined, the optimal 
expenditures on  individual activities are determined by  (8) with  C*(t) = 
The solution of  (9) follows by  applying stochastic dynamic programming 
as in Merton (1990b, chaps. 4, 5,  6).  Define the Bellman, or derived-utility, 
function J by 
cyQ;Sk. 
m 
conditional on W(t) = W and S(t) = S. From Merton (1990a, 555; 1990b, 




subject to J(O,S,t) = J;  u(0,  . . . ,O,T)&, where subscripts on J denote par- 
tial derivatives with respect to W,  t, and Si,  i = 1, . . . ,m  and uo  = pijuiuj, 
the instantaneous covariance between the return on security i andj. A  is a 
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier reflecting the nonnegativity constraint on C,  and at 
the optimum it will satisfy A *C* = 0. The first-order conditions derived from 
(10) are 
(1la)  0 = U,(C*,S,t)  + A* -  J,(W,S,t) 
and 
” 
0 = J,(y -  r) + J,C  W~WU,~ 
I 
+ C Jkwg$kuiqki,  i = 1,  . . . ,n , 
1 
where C*  = C*(W,S,t) and w:  = w*(W,S,t) are the optimal expenditure, 
and portfolio rules expressed as functions of the state variables and subscripts 
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From (  1  1  a), the optimal expenditure rule is given by 
UC(C*,S,f)  = J,(W,S,t)  for C* > 0 
(12)  x*  = max [0,  J,(W,S,t)  - U,(O,S,t)] 
From (1  lb), the optimal portfolio allocation can be written as 
(13)  w,*W  = Ab, + 2  H,h,, i = 1, . . . ,n , 
where 6, = C; vI,(a, -  I); h, = C; u$J,q,,v,,;  v,, is the ij element of the in- 
verse of  the instantaneous variance-covariance matrix of  returns (u,,);  A  = 
-  JJJ,  (the reciprocal of absolute risk aversion of the derived-utility func- 
tion); and H, = -  J,JJ,,,  k = 1, . . . ,m. A and H, depend on the individual 
university’s intertemporal preferences for expenditures and  its current net 
worth. However, 6,  and h,,  are determined entirely by the dynamic structures 
for the asset price returns and the unit costs of  the various activities under- 
taken by  universities. Hence, those parameters are the same for all universi- 
ties, independent of their preferences or endowment size. 
To provide some economic intuition about the optimal allocation of endow- 
ment  in (1  3), consider as a frame of  reference the “standard” intertemporal 
portfolio-selection problem with state-independent utility, U = U(C(t),t).  As 
shown in Merton (1990b, 131-36),  given the posited return dynamics in (5), 
all such investors will hold instantaneously mean-variance efficient portfolios 
as their optimal portfolios. For aUlaSk = Uk = 0,  H, = 0,  k  = 1, . . . ,m. 
Hence, in this case, (13) becomes w,”W  = Ab,, and w,“Wlw,”W = b,/b,, the 
same for all investors. This is the well-known result that the relative holdings 
of risky assets are the same for all mean-variance efficient portfolios. How- 
ever, the state-dependent preferences for universities induced by  the uncer- 
tainty surrounding the relative costs of undertaking different desired activities 
causes the more complex demand structure in (  13). 
To  better understand this differential demand, w,*W -  Ab, = Z;l  HJl,,, it 
is useful to examine the special case where for each cost S, there exists an 
asset whose instantaneous  return is perfectly correlated with changes in S,.  By 
renumbering securities if  necessary, choose the convention that q,  =  1 in 
(5a), k = 1, . , . ,m  (m  <  n).  As shown in Merton (1990b, 203-4),  it follows 
that in this case, h,  = gJ@,  for k  = 1, . . . ,m  and h, = 0 for k  # j. 
Hence, we can rewrite (13) as 
m 
I 
i=  1, ...  wTW  = Abi + -  Hi gi si 
mi 
= Ab,  i=m+  1, ...,  n. 
By  the strict concavity of  U with respect to C,  J  is strictly concave in  W. 
Hence, J,,  < 0 and Hi = -  J,JJ,,  is positively proportional to JiW.  Thus, 224  Robert C. Merton 
relative to a “normal” investor with state-independent preferences (i.e., H, = 
0, i = 1, . . . ,m) but the same current level of absolute risk aversion (i.e., 
-JdJ,),  the university will optimally hold more of asset  i if J,, > 0 and 
less if J,, <  0,  i = 1, . . . ,m. 
If J,, > 0, then at least locally the university’s marginal utility (or “need”) 
for wealth or endowment becomes larger if the cost of undertaking activity  i 
increases, and it becomes smaller if this cost decreases. Because the return on 
asset i is perfectly positively correlated with the cost of  activity i, a greater 
than expected increase in S, will coincide with a greater than expected return 
on asset  i.  By holding  more of asset i than a “normal”  investor would, the 
university thus assures itself of a relatively larger endowment in the event that 
S, increases and the need for wealth becomes more important. The university, 
of  course, pays for this by accepting a relatively smaller endowment in the 
event that S, decreases and wealth is less important. The behavioral descrip- 
tion for J,, <  0 is just the reverse, because the need for endowment decreases 
if the cost of  activity i increases. 
To  perhaps help in developing further insights, we use (1  2) to interpret the 
differential demand component in (14) in terms of the indirect utility and op- 
timal  expenditure  functions.  By  differentiating  (12),  we  have  that,  for 
C*(W,S,t)  > 0, 
ac* 
J,,  = U,,(C*,S,t)  ~ aw 
ac* 
Jkw = ucc(C*,S,t)  ~  + U,-,(C*,S,t) 
ask 
-  ac* 
for k = 1, . . . ,m.  Because U,, <  0 and aC*/aW >  0 for C* >  0, we see that 
the sign of Hk  is determined by the impact of a change in the cost of activity k 
on two items: the optimal level of  total current expenditure and the marginal 
utility of expenditure. So, for example, if an increase in S, would cause both 
a decrease in optimal expenditure (aC*/aS, < 0) and an increase in the mar- 
ginal utility of expenditure (U,, > 0), then, from (15), Hk  >  0 and the univer- 
sity will optimally hold more of asset k than the corresponding investor with 
a mean-variance efficient portfolio. 
Following  (14)  causes  the  university’s  optimal  portfolio  to  be  mean- 
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greater volatility than other feasible portfolios with the same expected return. 
However, the value of the endowment or net worth of the university is not the 
“end” objective. Instead, it is the “means” by  which the ends of  a preferred 
expenditure policy  can be  implemented. Viewed  in terms of  the volatility 
of the time path of expenditure (or more precisely, the marginal utility of  ex- 
penditure), the optimal strategy given in (14) is mean-variance efficient (cf. 
Breeden  1979; Merton  1990b, 487-88).  That is, because aC*laW > 0, the 
additional increment in  wealth that,  by  portfolio construction, occurs pre- 
cisely when S,  increases will tend to offset the negative impact on C* caused 
by  that increase. There is thus a dampening of the unanticipated fluctuations 
in expenditure over time. In sum, we see that in addition to investing in assets 
to achieve an efficient risk-return trade-off in wealth, universities should opti- 
mally use their endowment to hedge against unanticipated and unfavorable 
changes in the costs of the various activities that enter into their direct utility 
functions. 
In closing this section, we note that the interpretation of the demand func- 
tions in the general case of (1  3) follows along the same lines as for the special 
case of  perfect correlation leading to (14). As  shown for the general case in 
Merton (1990a, 558-59;  1990b, 501-2),  the differential demands for assets 
reflect attempts to create portfolios with the maximal feasible correlations be- 
tween their returns and unanticipated changes in the S,, k = 1, . . . ,111.  These 
maximally correlated portfolios perform the same hedging function as assets 
1, . . . ,m in the limiting case of perfect correlation analyzed in (14). Further- 
more,  if  other  state  variables besides  the  various  activities’ costs  (e.g., 
changes in the investment opportunity set) enter a university’s derived utility 
function,  then  a  similar  structure  of  differential  asset  demands to  hedge 
against the unanticipated changes in these variables will also obtain. 
7.4  Optimal Endowment Management with Other Sources of Income 
In  the previous section,  we  identified hedging of  the costs of  university 
activities as a reason for optimally deviating from “efficient” portfolio allo- 
cations when endowment is the only means for financing those activities. In 
this section, we extend the analysis to allow other sources of cash flow to sup- 
port the activities. To  simplify the analysis, we make two additional assump- 
tions. First, we posit that  pk  and 6, in (3) are constants, which implies that 
Yk(t)lYk(0)  is lognormally distributed, k = 1, . . .  ,N. Second, we assume that 
for each k there exists a traded security whose return is instantaneously per- 
fectly correlated with the unanticipated change in Y,,  k  =  1,  . . . ,N. By 
renumbering if  necessary, we use the convention that traded security k is in- 
stantaneously perfectly correlated with Y,. Hence, it follows that {,  = 1 in 
(5a) and 
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These two assumptions permit us to derive a closed-form solution for the 
capitalized values of the cash flows, [V,(t)],  using contingent-claims analysis. 
As will be shown, those valuation functions are independent of the universi- 
ty’s preferences or wealth level. 
From (3), (3,  and (16) with p, and 6, constant, we have that the cash flows 
can be written as a function of the traded asset prices as follows, for k  = 1, 
. . .  ,N, 
(17)  ‘k(‘)  = Yk(o)exp( -  $kf)  [pk(r)lpk(o)lPk  7 
where +,  = p, (a,  -  a:/2)  - (p, -  6:/2)  and p, =  6Ja,.  That (17) obtains 
can be checked by applying Id’s Lemma. We now derive the capitalized value 
for Y,,  following Merton (1990a, 562-63;  1990b, 415-19). 
Let Fk (P,, t) be the solution to the partial differential equation, for 0 5 
t I  T,, 
(18) 
subject to the boundary conditions: 
( 19b) 
0 = 112  aFiF:, + rP,Fi - rFk + F:  + Y, 
(  194  Fk(0,t)  = 0 
Fk/(P,)Pk bounded as P, 4  m 
(19c)  Fk(pk,Tk) = 0  9 
where subscripts on Fk in (18) denote partial derivatives with respect to its 
arguments P, and r; Y,  is given by  (17); and T, is the last date at which the 
university receives the cash flows from source k,  k = 1, . . . ,N. It is a math- 
ematical result that a solution exists to (1  8)-(  19) and that it is unique. More- 
over, for Y,  2 0, Fk 2 0 for all P, and t. 
Consider a dynamic portfolio strategy in which F:[P,(t),t]P,(t)  is allocated 
to traded asset k at time rand V(r) -  F,k[P,(t),t]P,(r)  is allocated to the riskless 
asset, where V(t)  is the value of the portfolio at time t. Furthermore, let the 
portfolio distribute cash (by selling securities if necessary) according to the 
flow-rate rule 
(20)  D,(Pk,t)  = yk(t) 
as given by  (17). Then the dynamics of the portfolio can be written as, for 
P,(t) = P, and V(t) = V, 
(21)  dV = Ff(P,,t)dP, + {[V -  Ff(P,,t)P,]r -  D,(P,,t)}dt . 
Since Fk satisfies (18), it is a twice continuously differentiable function and 
therefore, by ItB’s Lemma, we can write the dynamics for Fk as 
(22)  dFk = 112 a:  Pi F:, + F:  dt + FfdP, . 
But Fk satisfies (18) and hence,  1/2 a:  Pi Ff, + Ft  = rFk - rP,F:  - Y,. 
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(23) 
From (21) and (23), we have that 
(24) 
dFk = Ft dP, + (rFk -  rP$t  - Y,)dt 
dV -  dFk =(rV -  rP&  -  D,  -  rFk + rP,F:  + Y,)dt 
= r(V -  Fk)dt 
because D,  = Y,. By inspection, (24) is an ordinary differential equation with 
solution 
(25)  V(t) -  Fk[Pk(t),tl  = {v(o) -  ~k[~~(~)~~l)e~p(~~)  . 
Thus,  if  the  initial investment in  the portfolio is chosen so that  V(0) = 
F,[P,(O),O],  then for all t and P,(t), we have that 
(26)  V(t) = Fk[P,(t),t]  . 
To  ensure that the proposed portfolio strategy is feasible, we must show that 
its value is always nonnegative for every possible sample path for the price P, 
and all f,  0 5  t I  T,. Because Fk is the solution to (18) and Y, 2  0, Fk 2  0 for 
all P, and  t. It follows from (26) that  V(t) 2  0 for all P, and  t.  We  have 
therefore constructed a feasible dynamic portfolio strategy in traded asset k 
and the riskless asset that produces the stream of cash flows Y,(t)dt for 0 5 
t 5  T, and has zero residual value [V(T,) = 01  at Tk. 
Because the derived strategy exactly replicates the stream of  cash flows 
generated by  source k, it is economically equivalent to owning the cash flows 
Y,(t)  for t 5 T,. It follows that the capitalized value of these cash flows satisfies 
(27)  vk(t)  = Fk[P,(t),tl 
for k = 1, . . . ,N. Note that by inspection of (18)-(19),  Fk,  and hence V,(t), 
does not depend on either the university’s preferences or its net worth. The 
valuation for source k is thus the same for all universities. 
Armed with (27), we now turn to the optimal policy for managing endow- 
ment when the university has N nonendowment sources of  cash flows. The 
procedure is the one outlined in section 7.2. To derive the optimal policy, note 
first that even if those nonendowment sources cannot actually be sold by the 
university for legal, ethical,  moral hazard, or asymmetric information rea- 
sons, the university can achieve the economic  equivalent of a sale by follow- 
ing the “mirror image,” or reverse, of  the replicating strategy. That is, by 
(short selling or) taking a  -Flk[Pk(t),r]Pk  position in asset k and borrowing 
(Fk -  F,,P,) of the riskless asset at each t,  the portfolio will generate a posi- 
tive amount of cash, Fk(P,,t),  available for investment in other assets at time 
t. The entire liability generated by  shorting this portfolio is exactly the nega- 
tive cash flows, (- Y,dt), for t 5  T,, because V,(T,) = Fk(P,,  T,) = 0. But, 
since the university receives Y,dt for t 5  T,  from source k,  this short-portfolio 
liability is entirely offset. Hence, to undertake this strategy beginning at time 228  Robert C. Merton 
t is the economic equivalent of selling cash flow source k for a price of Vk(t) 
As discussed more generally in Merton (1990b, sec. 14.5, esp. 465-67), 
the optimal portfolio strategy  will be as if  all N  nonendowment assets were 
sold  and  the  proceeds,  together  with  endowment,  invested  in the  n  risky 
traded assets and the riskless asset. This result obtains because it is feasible to 
sell (in the economic sense) the nonendowment  assets and because  all the 
economic benefits  from  those  assets can be  replicated  by  dynamic  trading 
strategies in the traded assets. Hence, there is neither an economic advantage 
nor a disadvantage to retaining the nonendowment assets. It follows that the 
optimal demand for the traded risky assets is given by (13) and the demand 
for the riskless asset is given by (1 -  Z;w,*)W(t),  where from (4) and (27) 
= F';[P,(t),t]. 
Because, however, the university has not actually sold the nonendowment as- 
sets, the optimal demands given by (13) and (28) include both implicit and 
explicit holdings of  the traded assets. That is, the university's  ownership of 
nonendowment cash flow source k at time t is equivalent to having an addi- 
tional  net  worth  of  Fk[P,(t),t],  as  reflected  in  (28),  and  to  having 
F~[P,(t),t]P,(t)  invested  in traded asset k  and {Fk[P,(t),t]  -  F;[P,(t),t]P,(t)} 
invested  in  the riskless  asset.  Thus, ownership of  source k  causes implicit 
investments in traded asset k and the riskless asset. Optimal explicit invest- 
ment in each traded asset is the position actually observed in the endowment 
portfolio, and it is equal to the optimal demand given by (13) and (28) minus 
the implicit investment in that asset resulting from ownership of nonendow- 
ment assets. Let D*(t) denote the optimal explicit investment in traded asset i 
by the university at time t.  It follows from (13) that 
m 
D*(t) = Ab, + C H,hki -  F;[P,(t),tIP,(t)  ,  i  = 1, . . . ,N 
(29)  I 
" 
= Ab, + 2  Hkhki  ,i=N+  1  ,...,  n, 
I 
where W(t)  used in the evaluation of  A and H,  is given by (28). If we number 
the riskless asset by "tz  + 1 ," then explicit investment in the riskless asset can 
be written as 
n  N 
D*,+,(t)  = [1 - CW~(t)lW(f)  - C{m,(t),tI  -  F;[P,(r),tIP,<t)l 
(30)  1  1 
By inspection of (29), it is apparent that, in addition to the hedging of activity 
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differences between the observed holdings of assets in the optimal endowment 
portfolio and the mean-variance efficient portfolio of  a "standard" investor. 
Similarly, from (30), the observed mix between risky assets and the riskless 
asset will differ from the true economic mix. 
To explore further the effects of those nonendowment sources of cash flows, 
we solve the optimal expenditure and portfolio-selection problem for a spe- 
cific utility function,  U.  However, in preparation for that analysis, we  first 
derive explicit formulas for the capitalized values of those sources when Y,(t) 
is given by  (17). As already noted, there exists a unique solution to (18) and 
(19). Hence, it is sufficient to simply find a solution. As can be verified by 
direct substitution into (18), the value of cash flow source k is given by,  for k 
= 1,. . . ,N, 
where P,,  4, are as defined in (1 7) and 
(3 14 
It follows from (31) that, fork = 1, . . . ,N, 
0, = r + &(a, -  r) -  p.,  . 
(32)  F:[P,(t),tlPk(t) = ppk[p,(t)3t1  7 
which implies that the capitalized value of  source k has a constant elasticity 
with respect to the price of traded asset k. Equation (32) also implies that the 
replicating portfolio strategy is a constant-proportion or rebalancing strategy 
which allocates fraction p,  of the portfolio to traded asset k and fraction (1 - 
p,)  to the riskless asset. In the case when positive fractions are allocated to 
both assets (i.e., [l - p,] > 0 and  p,  > 0), then P  is a strictly concave 
function of P,. If  p,  > 1, then Fk is a strictly convex function of P,, and the 
replicating portfolio  holds  traded  asset  k  leveraged by  borrowing.  In  the 
watershed case of  p,  =  1, Fk is a linear function of  P,, and the replicating 
portfolio holds traded asset k only. 
Using (17) and (27), we can rewrite (31) to express the capitalized value of 
source k in terms of the current cash flow it generates: 
1 -  exp[ -  0,(T, - t)] 
(33)  V,(t) = Y,(t)  ,k=  1 ,...,  N. 
'k 
From (17),  (31a), and (32), it is a straightforward application of It6's Lemma 
to show that the total expected rate of  return for holding source k from t to 
t + dt is given by 
(34) 
= [I + pk(a, -  r)]dt . 230  Robert C. Merton 
Thus,  if  the rights to the cash flows Y, between  t and  Tk were sold in  the 
marketplace, the expected rate of return that would be required by  investors 
to bear the risk of  these flows is r  + Pk(ak  - r). Therefore, 8,  equals the 
required expected rate of return (the capitalization rate) minus the expected 
rate of  growth of  the cash flows, p,. By inspection of (33), Vk(t)  can be ex- 
pressed  by  the classic present-value formula for assets with exponentially 
growing cash flows. For 0, > 0, the perpetual (T, = w) value is Y,(t)lO,, and 
the limiting “earnings-to-price” ratio, Y,(t)lVk(t),  is 8,,  a constant. Applying 
the closed-form solution for P,  we can by substitution from (27) and (32) into 
(29) and (30) rewrite the optimal demand functions as 
m 
Df(t) = Ab, + 2  HJt,, - P,V,(t) ,  i = 1, . . . ,N 
(354  1 
m 
= Ab, + 2  H,h,,  ,i  = N  + 1,.  . . ,n 
l 
and 
Having derived explicit formulas for the values of nonendowment assets, we 
turn now to the solution of the optimal portfolio and expenditure problem in 
the special case where the university’s objective function is given by 
with p >  0 and r, 2 0, j  = 1, . . . ,m.  Without loss of generality, we assume 
that Zyri = 1. From (8), the optimal Q, satisfy 
(37) 
From (36) and (37), the indirect utility function can be written as 
m 
(38)  v(c,s,t)  = exp(-pt){iog  c - Crj[iog s, - log (r,)]}  . 
I 
It follows from (1 la) that the optimal expenditure rule is 
(39) 
1 
C*(t) = exp( -pt) 
J,(W,S,d  . 
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for some function  Z(S,t). By  the verification  theorem  of  dynamic program- 
ming, satisfaction of (lo),  (1  la), and (1 lb) is sufficient to ensure that J in (40) 
is the optimum. 
It follows from (40) that Jkw  = 0 and hence that H,  = 0 in (13) and (33,  k 
=  1,  . . . ,m.  Therefore, for the log utility  specified in (36),  there are no 
differential  hedging  demands  for  assets  to  protect  against  unanticipated 
changes in  the  costs  of  university  activities. The optimal  allocation of  the 
university’s  total  net worth  is thus instantaneously  mean-variance  efficient. 
Noting  that A  =  -J,/J,,  = W,  we have that (35) can be written in this 
special case as 
(414  Df(t) = b,W - P,V,(t) ,  i = 1, . . . ,N 
= b,W  ,i  = N  +  1,.  . . ,n 
and 
N 
(41b)  D,*+,(t)  (1 - CbJW - 21  - P,Y,(t) ‘ 
I  I 
By inspection of  (41), in the absence of nonendowment assets, the fraction of 
endowment allocated to risky asset i in the university’s optimal portfolio is b,, 
i =  1, . . . ,n, and the fraction allocated to the riskless asset is (1 -  qb,), 
independent of the level of endowment. If x,* = Df(t)/K(t)  is the optimal frac- 
tion of endowment invested in asset  i, then from (41) the difference in frac- 
tional allocations caused by the nonendowment assets is 
(424 
and 
xf(t) - b, = R(b, - P,XJ ,  i =  1, . . . ,N 
= Rbl  ,i  = N  + 1,.  . . ,n 
where A,  = V,(t)/X:V,(t) is the fraction of the capitalized value of  the univer- 
sity’s total nonendowment assets contributed by cash flow source k at time t, 
k  = 1, . . . ,N, and R =  XyVl(t)/K(t)  is the ratio of  the values of  the universi- 
ty’s nonendowment assets to its endowment assets at time t. 
As discussed in  section  7.2, the differences in (42) are the result  of two 
effects: (1) the “wealth” effect caused by the difference between the net worth 
and the endowment of the university and (2) the “substitution” effect caused 
by the substitution of nonendowment asset holdings for traded asset holdings. 
Suppose, for concreteness, that the expected returns,  variances, and covari- 
ances  are such that  a positive  amount of each traded  risky  asset is held  in 
mean-variance efficient portfolios. Then, 6, > 0, i  =  1, . . . ,n. It follows 
that the impact of the wealth effect in (42a) and (42b), (RbJ, is unambiguous: 
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to each risky asset and therefore a smaller percentage allocation to the riskless 
asset. Because p, 2 0 and A, > 0, i = 1, . . . ,N, we have that the impact of 
the substitution  effect in (42a) and (42b), (RPzA,),  is also unambiguous:  for 
those traded assets  1, . . . ,N for which the nonendowment assets are substi- 
tutes, the fractional allocation is smaller; for the traded assets N  + 1, . . . ,n, 
the fractional allocation is unchanged; and the allocation to the riskless asset 
thus increases. 
Because  the wealth  and substitution effects are in opposite directions for 
b, > 0, whether the optimal endowment portfolio allocates an incrementally 
larger or smaller fraction to traded asset k depends on whether 6, > P,A,  or 
b, < PJ,.  P,h,  is the fraction of the total increment to net worth (from nonen- 
dowment assets) that is implicitly invested in asset k as the result of  owning 
cash flow source k. If  that fraction exceeds the optimal one for total wealth, 
b,,  then  the  optimal  endowment portfolio  will  hold  less  than  the  mean- 
variance efficient allocation.  Indeed, if  A,  > (1 + R)b,/(RP,),  then x,*(t) < 0 
and the university  would  optimally  short sell traded  asset k  in its portfolio. 
This is more likely to occur when R is large (i.e., nonendowment assets are a 
large part of  university net worth) and A,  is large (i.e., cash flow source k is a 
large part of the value of  nonendowment assets). 
The implications of (42a) and (42b) for optimal endowment fit the intuitions 
discussed at length in section 7.2. For instance, if a significant amount of gift 
giving to  a particular  university  depends  on the performance  of the general 
stock market, then in effect that university has a “shadow” investment in that 
market.  Hence,  all  else  the  same,  it  should  hold  a  smaller  portion  of 
its  endowment  in  stocks than  another  university  with  smaller  amounts  of 
such  market-sensitive  gift giving. As  noted  in  section 7.2, much  the same 
substitution-effect  story  applies  to  concentrations  in  other  assets,  includ- 
ing real estate. The same analysis also follows where grants from firms or 
the government are likely to be strongly correlated with the financial perfor- 
mance of  stocks in the related  industries.  However, the underweightings  in 
those assets for substitution-effect reasons can be offset by sufficiently strong 
demands to hedge against costs, as is illustrated by the biotech example in sec- 
tion 7.2. 
The analysis leading to (29) and (30) requires that there exist traded securi- 
ties  which  are  instantaneously  perfectly  correlated  with  the  changes in  Y,, 
. . . , Y,.  If this “complete market” assumption is relaxed, then the capitalized 
values  of  those  nonendowment  cash  flow  sources  will  no  longer  be  inde- 
pendent  of  the university’s preferences  and  endowment. However,  the  im- 
pact on endowment investments will be qualitatively similar. This more gen- 
eral case of  nonreplicable assets can be analyzed along the lines of Svensson 
(1988). 
We can use our model to examine the impact of nonendowment cash flow 
sources on optimal expenditure policy. From (39) and (40), we have that the 
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(43)  C*(t) = pW(t) 
However, current expenditure from endowment will not follow a constant pro- 
portion strategy. Optimal expenditure from endowment at time t is [C*(t) - 
Cy  Y,(t)]dt,  which can be either positive or negative (implying net saving from 
nonendowment cash flow sources).  If  s*(t) denotes the optimal expenditure 
rate as a fraction of  endowment (= [C*(t) - Ey  Y,(t)]/K(t)),  then  from (4) 
and (43), 
where R(t)  is as defined in (42a) and (42b) and y(t) = [Cy Y,(t)]/[C;  V,(t)]  is 
the current  yield  on the  capitalized  value of  the  nonendowment  sources of 
cash flow. In the special case of (33), where the cash flows are all perpetuities 
(i.e., T, = ~0 and 8, > 0, k  =  1,  . . . ,M, V,(t) = Y,(t)/e,  and the current 
yield on source k is constant and equal to Or.  In that case, y(r) = Cy  X,8,,  the 
value-weighted current yield. From (31a), Ok will tend to be smaller for assets 
with higher expected growth rates of cash flow, (KJ.  If on average the current 
yield on nonendowment assets is less than p,  then the current spending rate 
out of endowment will exceed p. If the current yield is high so that y(t) > p, 
then s*(t) <  p. Indeed, if y(t) > p( 1 + R)/R,  then s*(t) < 0 and optimal total 
expenditure  is  less  than  current  cash  flow  generated  by  nonendowment 
sources. Because both R(t)  and A,(t) change over time, we have from (44) that 
the optimal current expenditure rate from endowment is not a constant, even 
when expected returns on assets, the  interest  rate,  and the expected rate of 
growth of nonendowment cash flows are constants. 
We can also analyze the dynamics of the mix of the university’s net worth 
between  endowment  and nonendowment  assets.  If a = r  + 2; b,(az - r) 
denotes the  instantaneous  expected  rate of  return  on  the  growth-optimum, 
mean-variance efficient portfolio, then, as shown in Merton (1990b, 169-71), 
the  resulting  distribution  for that portfolio  is lognormal with instantaneous 
expected return a(>  r)  and instantaneous variance rate equal to (a - r). It 
follows  from (6), (41), and  (43) that the dynamics  for the  university’s  net 
worth are such that W(t)/W(O)  is lognormally distributed with 
(45) 
If X,(t) = V,(t)/W(t)  denotes the fraction of  net worth represented by nonen- 
dowment cash flow source k, then, because V,  and W are each lognormally 
distributed, X,(t) is lognormally distributed, and from (33) and (45) 234  Robert C. Merton 
Ir 
(a + r  + Si) 
2  4l0gx~]  = [Pi + P - 
fork = I,. . . ,N. 
From (46), the fraction of  total net worth represented by all sources of non- 
endowment cash flow, X(t) = Xy X,(t)  = R(t)/ll + R(t)], is expected to grow 
or decline depending on whether p > 8,,,  or p <  On,,,  where Om,,  =-  min(O,), k 
= 1, . . . ,N. In effect, a university with either a high rate of time preference 
or at least one (perpetual) high-growth  nonendowment  asset (i.e., with  p > 
Om,,)  is expected to “eat” its endowment. Indeed, it may even go to a “nega- 
tive” endowment by borrowing against the future cash flows of its nonendow- 
ment assets.  Whether this expected  growth in X(t) is the result of  declining 
expected  net worth or rising asset values can be determined  from (45). Be- 
cause a > r, if p I  r,  then both the arithmetic and geometric expected rates 
of growth for net worth are positive. For p <  O,,,,,  it follows that E,[X(r)] -+ 0 
as rwm. Hence, in the long run of this case, endowment is expected to become 
the dominant component of  the university’s net worth. Of course, these “ra- 
zor’s edge” results on growth or decline reflect the perpetual, constant-growth 
assumptions  embedded in nonendowment  cash flow behavior.  However, this 
special case does capture the essential  elements affecting  optimal  portfolio 
allocation and expenditure policies (cf. Tobin 1974). 
The formal analysis here assumes that endowment is fungible for other as- 
sets and that neither spending nor investment policy are restricted.  Such re- 
strictions on endowment could be incorporated,  using the same Kuhn-Tucker 
type analysis used in section 7.3  to take account of the constraint that total 
expenditure at each point in time is nonnegative. The magnitudes of the Kuhn- 
Tucker multipliers at the optimum would provide a quantitative assessment of 
the cost of each such restriction.  However, including those restrictions is not 
likely to materially change the basic insights about hedging and diversification 
derived  in  the unrestricted  case.  The model  can  also be  integrated  into  a 
broader one for overall university financial planning.  Such integration would 
permit  the  evaluation  of  other  nonendowment  financial  policies  such  as 
whether the university should sell forward contracts for tuition. 
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Comment  George M. Constantinides 
In addressing the complex problem of  optimal investment strategies for uni- 
versity endowment funds, Robert Merton adopts the view that the university 
is an economic  agent maximizing  the expected  utility  of  a set of  activities 
subject to a budget constraint. In so doing, he is able to frame the problem in 
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the  standard  microeconomiclfinance  paradigm  and  draw  heavily  on the  fi- 
nance literature to which he is a seminal contributor. Standard finance theory 
dictates that the university allocate its endowment plus capitalized nonendow- 
ment future income in a mean-variance efficient portfolio of financial assets, 
modified by an overlay of hedging portfolios designed to hedge against unan- 
ticipated shifts in the state variables.  The extent of  hedging depends on the 
prices and price expectations of financial assets and on the sensitivity of  the 
university’s marginal utility of  wealth to the shifts of the state variables. 
I begin  by  discussing  the university’s objective  in  managing  the endow- 
ment. Next I review Merton’s model and principal results. I then present some 
generalizations and offer some concluding remarks. 
The Objective in Managing the Endowment 
The task of managing a university’s endowment ought to be placed in the 
general context of  the goals of  a university.  In  addressing  the goals of  the 
university, we discuss three questions: (1) What, if any, objective function do 
market  forces impose on the university? (2) What objective function do the 
university trustees and administration  apply in practice? (3) What is the so- 
cially desirable objective function of a university? In particular, we consider 
two paradigms of the university, first as a utility-maximizing agent and second 
as a profit-maximizing firm. 
The Objective Function Imposed by Market Forces 
Is  it  plausible  to  model  the  university  as  an  economic  agent  with  a 
university-wide  increasing and concave utility function? Even if  we assign a 
utility  function  to each one of the agents who make up the university, what 
devices exist which equalize their marginal rate of  substitution and lead to the 
existence of  a university-wide  utility  function? To some extent, universities 
compete for students, funding, and the services of faculty, officers, and staff. 
There are also transfer  payments  between  the  undergraduate  and  graduate 
divisions  of  the  college, professional  schools, and  research  groups. But  I 
very much doubt that these market mechanisms are adequate to equalize the 
marginal  rate of  substitution  and give rise to a university-wide  utility  func- 
tion. 
Is it plausible to model the university  as a profit-maximizing firm? A uni- 
versity does not have a clearly defined group of residual claimants. There are 
diverse groups of claimants to the services of a university  which include the 
past, current, and future generations of students, the faculty, staff, and indus- 
try. Furthermore the threat of a takeover or reorganization,  which leads cor- 
porations toward the goal of profit maximization,  does not apply with equal 
force to universities,  I view the university as a nexus of  contracts among eco- 
nomic agents which include the state government and legislature in the case 238  Robert C. Merton 
of state universities; the alumni, trustees, and officers; a highly individualistic 
and fragmented faculty; and last but not least a heterogeneous  student body 
with “overlapping  generations” features. Rothschild and White, in chapter  1 
of this volume, present an insightful discussion of these issues. 
The Objective Function Perceived by Universities 
A search through the academic literature on the objectives of the university 
provides valuable insights but falls short of providing answers on what objec- 
tives  universities  do or should  adopt. In  addressing  the investment  income 
formula of the  American  Economic Association,  Nichols  (1974)  assigns a 
utility function to the association and outlines the implications of  the standard 
Fisherian analysis. Tobin (1974, 427) formulates the objective of the trustees 
of an endowed institution as “the guardians of the future against the present. 
Their task is to preserve equity among generations.  . . . In formal terms, the 
trustees are supposed to have a zero subjective rate of  time preference.” Tobin 
neither endorses nor justifies  these  perceived  goals. Litvack,  Malkiel,  and 
Quandt (1974) suggest that endowment management should (1) seek to make 
investment management independent of  the spending decisions of  the univer- 
sity, (2) protect the real value of the endowment fund, and (3) stabilize spend- 
able income. Finally, Hansmann (1990) surveys a number of possible theories 
to explain endowment accumulation  and explores their strengths and weak- 
nesses. Hansmann  is unable to find a plausible  and rational explanation  for 
observed endowment accumulation policies. 
The lack of consensus on the perceived objectives of  universities is hardly 
surprising. Universities are a diverse group of institutions with heterogeneous 
objectives.  In fact, as we argue next, there is no compelling reason why uni- 
versities should have uniform objectives. 
The Socially Desirable Objectives of  a University 
I argue that universities provide diverse services to the society, and there- 
fore different universities  serve the society best by  adopting different objec- 
tives. 
As my first example, consider a state university  system. Its financial col- 
lapse has major adverse effects on the current and future generations of  stu- 
dents, the academic community, and the economic and cultural life of the state 
and beyond. It seems socially desirable  that this  university  should follow a 
prudent policy of  diversifying its instructional and research activities and also 
diversify its endowment and capitalized nonendowment  income and hedge it 
against future contingencies. Merton’s paradigm of the university as a utility- 
maximizing agent has implications which, in this example, are socially desir- 
able. 
As my second example, consider a small, research-oriented university lo- 
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cialized industry. Suppose that this university relies heavily on the local indus- 
try for research contracts, the supply of students, and endowment income. If 
we adopt Merton’s paradigm, we conclude that the university should diversify 
its  research  and  instructional  activities  away  from the  local  industry  and 
should  hedge  its current and capitalized  nonendowment  income by  selling 
short, if possible, the stock of  the local industry firms. Is this policy socially 
desirable? 
A case can be made that society is best served by the exact opposite policy: 
specialize the research and instructional services to serve best the demands of 
the local industry and invest the endowment in the stock of the local industry 
firms. If the local industry declines into oblivion, so does the university whose 
social function was to serve this industry. If on the contrary the local industry 
flourishes, the university is best suited in terms of its specialization and finan- 
cial strength to serve the local industry. 
Which of  the two diametrically  opposite policies  is  socially  preferred? 
There is no simple answer. But I hope that the examples illustrate that diver- 
sification  is not always an obvious social attribute of the university’s objec- 
tive.  Furthermore, society  is served best by  different  universities following 
different, even diametrically opposite, policies. 
A Review of the Model and Principal Results 
Merton defines the university’s objective as the maximization of a von Neu- 
mann-Morgenstern,  time-separable, and concave utility function of the level 
of a set of activities  ~ Q(t) = [Q,(t),  -  . . . ,Q,,,(t)l as 
The price (or net cost) of  activityj  is S,(t). No distinction is made between the 
margin21 and  average cost of  an  activity;  we therefore  interpret the  supply 
of  activities as perfectly  elastic. The vector of  activity prices S(t) = [&(t), 
. . . ,S,(t)]  is an exogenous autoregressive process which Merton models as a 
continuous-time diffusion process. 
The endowment capital at the beginning of period t is K(t).  The nonendow- 
ment income at t is Y(t),  an exogenous stochastic process.  Merton  models 
[S(t),  Y(t)]  as a diffusion  process.  Merton assumes that the nonendowment 
income is spanned by the returns of  the financial assets. Then the nonendow- 
ment income stream [Y(t),  Y(r + l), . . . ] may be capitalized with value f(t). 
The university’s wealth is defined as w(t)  = K(t) + f(t),  the sum of endow- 
ment capital and capitalized present and future nonendowment income. 
The expenditure on activities at time t is Q’(t)S(t),  where the prime denotes 
the transpose. The wealth net of the currentexpenditure on activities is y(t) 240  Robert C. Merton 
-  Q’(t)S(t)  and is allocated among the financial assets with portfolio weights 
r(t)= [El(& . . . ,~,(t)],  which  sum up to one. The supply of  financial 
assets is perfectly elastic, and the asset returns over one period are denoted by 
R(t + 1) = [&,(t  + l), . . . Jn(r  + l)]. Merton models the joint process of 
financial asset prices, activity prices, and nonendowment  income as a diffu- 
sion process. The wealth dynamics is 
(2)  -  W(t +  1) = [W(r) -  Q’ (t)S(t)]w’  (t)R(t + 1) . 
Zero wealth is an absorbing state; that is, W(t)  = 0 implies zero investment in 
the activities and in the financial assets at all future times. 
The control variables are the activity levels Q(t)  and the portfolio weights 
vv(t). Stated formally, the university maximizesthe expected utility in (1) by 
the sequential  choice of  activity  levels and portfolio  weights  subject to the 
sequence of budget constraints, (2),  and the constraint of nonnegative wealth. 
Essentially, Merton models the university’s problem as the standard intertem- 
poral consumption and investment  problem, which  has been  studied exten- 
sively  in the finance literature  (see Fama and Miller  1972; Ingersoll  1987; 
Merton 1990). 
Merton proceeds  along familiar lines to define the indirect utility  of  con- 
sumption as 
(3)  u[c(t),  tl  = maxl@(t),  r1 
subject to -  Q’(t)S(t)  = C(t)  and then define the derived utility of wealth as 
(4) 
-  Q(t) 
J[W(r),  S(t), tl  =  max  E,{ i:  u[c(~),  ~(71,  TI} 
[w(t),C(t)l  = ‘ 
subject to the budget constraint. 
Merton’s primary  focus is on the portfolio  allocation,  that  is, the control 
variables E(t).  In general, the optimal portfolio consists of  a mean-variance 
efficient portfolio  of  the endowment plus the capitalized nonendowment  in- 
come, modified by an overlay of hedging portfolios designed to hedge against 
unanticipated shifts in the state variables. In the special case where the indi- 
rect utility of  consumption is the sum of  the logarithm of  consumption and a 
function of the state variables,  a myopic policy is optimal: the university  in- 
vests the endowment plus the capitalized nonendowment  income in a mean- 
variance efficient portfolio, without an overlay of hedging portfolios. 
Generalizations 
The University’s Production Function 
Whether  we choose to view the university  as a consumer of activities,  a 
profit-maximizing firm, or a nexus of contracts, we should explore the pro- 241  Optimal Investment Strategies for University Endowment Funds 
duction function of the university. The inputs are the expenditures on teach- 
ing, faculty, research, physical plant, and public relations-to  mention just a 
few. The outputs are the activities in Merton’s terminology. We should recog- 
nize that it takes many years to build a reputation, to attract the best student 
applicants, to build a superior faculty, or to create a niche in a certain aca- 
demic field. Therefore, the production function should incorporate adjustment 
costs and “time to build.” 
For a minority of activities, such as student aid or visiting faculty, the price 
per activity unit is exogenous and well defined. But for the majority of univer- 
sity activities,  the prices are endogenous. Merton is aware of  this and points 
out that his exogenous price processes of activities can be viewed as “reduced- 
form” equilibrium price processes.  Still it remains unclear whether Merton 
views  these  prices  as marginal  or average.  In  his budget equation  (6), the 
activity expenditures are the sum of  the product of activity levels and prices; 
therefore,  prices are interpreted as average prices. In his first-order equations 
(8), the same prices play the role of marginal prices. Therefore, the distinction 
between the marginal and average price of an activity is not drawn. The dis- 
tinction can be drawn by introducing a production function. 
The Intertemporal Complementarity  and Substitutability of the Activities in 
the University’s Preferences 
Some university  activities  exhibit  strong  intertemporal  substitutability:  a 
university basks in the glory of a Nobel laureate among its ranks long after the 
laureate has retired. Other activities exhibit strong complementarities:  a uni- 
versity is more disturbed by the lowering of  its academic ranking than by the 
maintenance of a steady but low ranking. 
These effects can be modeled in one of  two ways. The first is to draw a 
distinction between  university outputs and activities.  The university  outputs 
are durable goods which produce a stream of activities over time. In this case, 
the  stream  of  activities  is not  directly  controllable,  and  Merton’s  analysis 
needs to be modified accordingly. 
The second way to model these effects is to define the university’s prefer- 
ences over the outputs rather than over the activity flows from these outputs. 
But then the preferences are no longer time separable, and we can no longer 
define a time-separable indirect utility function of consumption as in (3), ex- 
cept in simple cases. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the context of a simplified, or “reduced-form,’’ model of  a university  as 
a utility-maximizing agent, Merton has demonstrated that the basic principles 
of  finance apply and, in particular, endowment funds should be managed ac- 
cording to the principles of diversification and hedging. 
I have argued that universities are a diverse group of institutions with het- 
erogeneous functions in the society. Whereas diversification of  instructional 242  Robert C. Merton 
activities, research activities, and endowment and capitalized nonendowment 
income may be reasonable and socially desirable objectives of  some universi- 
ties,  it is an open question whether these  objectives are reasonable  and so- 
cially desirable for the whole spectrum of  universities. 
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